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An Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme Based on
Unrecognizable Trapdoors
Ruizhong Du , Ailun Tan, and Junfeng Tian
Abstract: Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has been widely used for ciphertext retrieval in the cloud environment.
However, bi-flexible attribute control and privacy keywords are difficult problems that have yet to be solved. In this
paper, we introduce the denial of access policy and the mutual matching algorithm of a dataset used to realize
bidirectional control of attributes in the cloud server. To solve the problem of keyword privacy, we construct a security
trapdoor by adding random numbers that effectively resist keyword guessing attacks from cloud servers and external
attackers. System security is reduced to the Deterministic Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) hypothesis problem. We
validate our scheme through theoretical security analysis and experimental verification. Experiments are conducted on
a real dataset, and results show that the scheme has higher security and retrieval efficiency than previous methods.
Key words: Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE); unrecognizable trapdoor; two-way access strategy; ciphertext search

1

Introduction

Cloud storage is a mainstream online storage method
that removes the hardware and management overhead
of users’ local storage and takes physical data out of
users’ control. In this environment, data security is
greatly threatened. Data encryption is generally adopted
to solve the data security problem in cloud storage, but
the availability of encrypted data is limited, especially
because the widely used keyword retrieval technology
of plaintext information cannot be directly applied to
encrypted data. Searchable encryption is a good solution
for ciphertext retrieval and has three main research
directions: security, accuracy, and efficiency.
1.1

Related work

To enhance the security of data on a server, Song
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et al.[1] first proposed a searchable encryption
scheme with a one-to-one mechanism. However, the
multi-user environment is challenging for searchable
encryption. Boneh et al.[2] proposed a searchable
encryption scheme based on public key cryptography
and proved that the public key searchable encryption
system satisfies semantic security, but the scheme cannot
resist keyword guessing attacks. A keyword guessing
attack is an attack mode in searchable encryption that
mainly involves statistical analysis of the uploaded
trapdoors. The keywords generate fixed trapdoors and
can thus be detected by the server or the attacker during
mass uploads. Fang et al.[3] proposed a public key
encryption scheme that resists keyword guessing attacks
without random prediction, but server internal attacks
are the weakness of this scheme. Shao and Yang[4]
also proposed a scheme that can resist server keyword
guessing attack. The best defense against keyword
guessing attacks is to make the trapdoors unrecognizable,
which means that the same keyword produces a
different trapdoor each time. Privacy protection of
keywords in searchable encryption mainly ensures the
privacy protection of trapdoors. How to construct secure
trapdoors is a difficult problem in searchable encryption.
To make ciphertext retrieval more flexible and
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efficient, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)[5] is
proposed. Among them, the Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (CP-ABE)[6] can embed the access
control strategy in ciphertext and control the access of
user attributes flexibly, but introduce the problem of
attribute cancellation. Data in the cloud environment
are dynamic and massive. Hence, the attribute-based
encryption scheme needs to modify attributes and
policies efficiently. Pirretti et al.[7] proposed a secure
attribute-based system scheme that could revoke
attributes. By setting an expiration date for attributes,
the authorizing agency periodically updates the attribute
version and revokes user attributes by revoking the
latest version of an attribute. However, attributebased encryption schemes have security, accuracy, and
efficiency problems. To solve the security problem, Hur
and Noh[8] proposed attribute-based encryption scheme
with attributes and user revocation capabilities, which
enhances the forward and backward security of user
access control and has attribute revocation ability. Li et
al.[9] proposed a searchable ciphertext policy attributebased encryption scheme, which has the ability to revoke
attributes in the Cloud Server (CS). To protect the privacy
of users, Ma et al.[10] proposed a privacy-preserving
multi-authority CP-ABE with a revocation scheme based
on privacy protection, which not only revokes attributes
but also protects users’ privacy effectively.
To improve the accuracy of attribute revocation in
searchable encryption schemes, Yang et al.[11] proposed
attribute-based fine-grained access control with an
efficient revocation scheme for cloud storage systems.
This scheme does not require any cooperative access
control by the server, and the Data Owner (DO) does
not need to be online in real time. However, the
program proves its security under random prediction
only. Zu et al.[12] proposed a new CP-ABE with an
efficient revocation scheme. The access structure of the
scheme adopts the Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS)
mode and has strong performance capability. For more
granular access, Sun et al.[13] used CP-ABE and proxy reencryption to implement file-level access authorization
and support data User (U) attribute revocation. Cui et
al.[14] proposed ABE with an expressive and authorized
keyword search scheme that is more accurate and
achieves fine-grained access control of encrypted data in
the cloud.
In terms of revocation efficiency, Xue et al.[15]
proposed a ciphertext comparable attribute-based
encryption scheme based on 0-1 encoding and an
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efficient construction method based on the generation
and management of subattributes with 0 and 1 encoding
concepts to reduce communication and computational
overhead. Outsourcing computing can greatly reduce
user online computing cost. Hence, Chen et al.[16]
proposed an online-offline ciphertext policy attributebased searchable encryption scheme that uses offline
preprocessing outsourcing decryption and reduces user
online computing cost while improving efficiency. To
reduce the computational cost of outsourcing decryption,
Zhao et al.[17] proposed a constant cipher-sized attributebased encryption scheme. The scheme’s ciphertext size
is constant, which not only improves the outsourcing
computational efficiency but also makes the system
efficient.
Research on ciphertext retrieval has become
increasingly diversified. Qian et al.[18] proposed a
ciphertext policy attribute-based searchable encryption
scheme for multi-authorization centers in the cloud
environment. The scheme uses re-encryption technology
to update the ciphertext during the process of attribute
revocation, and a multi-authorization center effectively
improves the overall efficiency of the program.
Broadcast encryption is a typical one-to-many mode.
Canard et al.[19] combined broadcast encryption with
attribute-based encryption to form a new secret sharing
method for one-to-many searchable encryption modes.
Xue et al.[20] combined deterministic deletion with
attribute-based encryption to propose an attribute-based
ciphertext retrieval scheme that supports revocation.
1.2

Our contribution

To solve the problem of trapdoor security and
attribute fine-grained access in existing schemes,
we propose an Attribute-Based Encryption scheme
based on Unrecognizable trapdoors (U-ABE). Our
scheme implements one-time trapdoor construction and
introduces a denial of access policy that makes attribute
control more flexible. The main contributions of this
work are as follows.
(1) To solve the trapdoor safety problem, we use the
bilinearity of bilinear mapping to construct a one-time
trapdoor and prove that the trapdoor is unidentifiable.
(2) To improve the flexible control of access policy,
we introduce a denial of access policy that is controlled
in both directions.
(3) Through theoretical security analysis, our
scheme satisfies the indistinguishable Keywords
Guessing Attack (called IND-KGA) and the statistically
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indistinguishability under Chosen Ciphertex Attack
(called IND-CCA) secure in the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (DBDH).
1.3

Organization of this article

The main parts of this paper are organized as follows:
Section 2 presents relevant basic knowledge. Section 3
briefly introduces the U-ABE scheme. Section 4
introduces the U-ABE scheme in detail. Section 5
presents an analysis of the accuracy and security
of the scheme. Section 6 provides the theoretical
and experimental analyses of the scheme. Section 7
summarizes this article.

2
2.1

Preliminary
Bilinear pairing

It is assumed that groups G and GT are cyclic groups
whose order is prime p:g is the generator of group G,
and there exists a bilinear map eO W G  G ! GT , that
satisfies the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: For any x; y 2 G and a; b 2 Zp , we
have e.x
O a ; y b / D e.x
O b ; y a / D e.x;
O y/ab , where Zp is
the set of nonnegative integers less than p.
(2) Non-degeneracy: e.g;
O g/ ¤ 1.
(3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to
compute e.x;
O y/ for any x; y 2 G.
2.2

DBDH

Let groups G1 and G2 and map eO W G1  G1 ! G2 ,
g is the generator of group G1 , randomly generate
.a; b; c; z/
Zp , and generate two quintuples T0 D
a
.g; A D g ; B D g b ; C D g c ; Z D e.g;
O g/z / and
a
b
c
T1 D .g; A D g ; B D g ; C D g ; Z D e.g;
O g/abc /.
Write the two five-tuples as
PBDH D .g; g a ; g b ; g c ; e.g;
O g/abc /;
RBDH D .g; g a ; g b ; g c ; e.g;
O g/z /:
DBDH assumption: There is an adversary without
polynomial time, who can at least distinguish the
quintuples PBDH and RBDH with a non-negligible
advantage .
2.3

List of symbols in the text

The meanings of the symbols in the system are as
follows:
B: Encryption parameter
Bi : Decryption parameter
t1 : Allow access policy
t2 : Denial of access policy
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U1 : Encrypted allowed access policy
U2 : Encrypted denial of access policy
CT: Ciphertext, including Cm and Ck
V : Version information of table
': Keyword index
w: Data keyword collection
wi : Retrieve keyword collection
S ka : Attribute private key set
Tw : Keyword trap
p: Matching information
2.4

Security model

The security model includes the statistically IND-KGA
secure and IND-CCA secure.
Definition 1 The statistically IND-KGA secure
allows Adversary A to execute the keyword guessing
attack to distinguish the trapdoors corresponding to w0
and w1 , Adversary A and Challenger C perform the
game as follows.
Setup: Given the security parameter , Challenger C
runs the initialization algorithm to generate the public
parameter par.
Phase 1: Adversary A runs the Trap.w; par/
algorithm multiple times.
Challenge: Adversary A randomly selects two
keywords w0 and w1 from the keyword space, then sends
them to Challenger C . Challenger C flips a random coin
 2 .0; 1/ , runs the algorithm Trap.w; par/, and finally
sends the trapdoor Tw to Adversary A.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Adversary A outputs a keyword 0 , and if
 D 0 , Adversary A wins the security game.
Definition 2 The security model includeds the
statistically IND-KGA secure and IND-CCA secure.
Setup: Given security parameter , Challenger C
executes the setup algorithm Init.l  / to generate the
public parameter par. Given groups G1 and G2 and map
eO W G1  G1 ! G2 . Challenger C randomly generates
.a; b; c; z/ ! Zp to generate a quintuple T0 , T0 D .g;
A D g a ; B D g b ; C D g c ; Z D e.g;
O g/z /.
Phase 1: Adversary A runs the encryption algorithm
multiple times.
Challenge: Adversary A randomly selects two
keywords m0 and m1 from the plaintext space, then
sends them to Challenger C . Challenger C flips a
random coin  2 .0; 1/, runs the encryption algorithm,
and finally sends the ciphertext CT to Adversary A.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Adversary A outputs a plaintext , if  D 0 ,
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Adversary A wins the security game.

3

System Model

The system model of the scheme is shown in Fig. 1. The
scheme includes four entities: DO, CS, U, and AA.
(1) AA: Assuming that the attribute authority is
trusted, its main tasks are to generate a random table
of attributes, encrypt the policy uploaded by the DO,
and calculate the encryption parameters. The attributes
uploaded by the U are calculated according to the table,
and the attribute private key and decryption parameters
are obtained.
(2) DO: The main task of the DO is to encrypt the data
by using traditional symmetric encryption. The addition
of random numbers generates an unrecognizable index,
and the data authority interacts with the AA to obtain an
access strategy.
(3) U: The main tasks of U are to generate
an unrecognizable random trapdoor, perform data
interaction with the CS, obtain the version number
returned by the server, and upload the version number
and its own attributes to the AA. The AA then calculates
and returns the private attribute key and decrypts the
parameter. Then, the private attribute key is uploaded
to the CS and the ciphertext is returned after the server
verifies.
(4) CS: The main tasks of the CS are to receive
the trapdoor uploaded by the U, deliver the ciphertext
version number to the U, receive the attribute private key
uploaded by the U, and deliver the ciphertext to the U
after the matching operation.
The following is an introduction to the algorithms
used in this article. There are a total of seven algorithms.
(1) Setup.1 / ! .Par; T /: The trusted AA runs the
algorithm, inputs the security parameter , and outputs
the public parameter par and the random attribute

table. The random attribute table is privately owned and
regularly updated by the AA.
(2) EncT.t1 ; t2 ; ss/ ! .U1 ; U2 ; B/: The algorithm
inputs t1 ; t2 , and ss, and outputs U1 ; U2 , and B. t1
is the set of allowed access policies uploaded by the
DO to the AA. t2 is the set of denial of access policies
uploaded by the DO to the AA. ss is the coordinates
where attributes in the property authority query t1 and
t2 set are positioned in the attribute table. U1 and U2
are encrypted from t1 and t2 , respectively. After ss
encryption, the encryption parameter B is obtained, and
the version information V of the table is embedded into
encryption parameter B. The AA returns the ciphertext
to the DO.
(3) Enc.m; k; w; B; par/ ! .CT; '/: The DO
calculates the algorithm. m; k; w; B, and par are
inputted, CT and ' are outputted. m is plaintext data,
k is a key symmetrically encrypted for plaintext, w
is the set of keywords contained in the data, and B is
the encryption parameter. The ciphertext CT includes
two ciphertexts: one is Cm , which is obtained by
symmetrically encrypting the plaintext m, and the other
is Ck , which is obtained by encrypting the key k. ' is
an index obtained by encrypting the keyword set w.
(4) Trap.w; par/ ! Tw : The user calculates the
algorithm. The w and par are inputted, and the Tw is
outputted. w is the keyword when the user queries. After
the calculation, the keyword trapdoor Tw is obtained and
uploaded to the CS for retrieval.
(5) KeyGen.att; V / ! SKa : The AA calculates the
algorithm. att and V are inputted, and SKa is outputted.
att is the attribute uploaded by the user, V is the version
information, and SKa is the attribute parameter.
(6) Search.U1 ; U2 ; '; Tw ; SKa / ! 1 or 0: The server
runs the algorithm for matching retrieval. The algorithm
is divided into two parts in the system. The first stage

V, CT, p

CT, φ, U1, U2
Tw, SKa
DO

CS
1

1

2

2

AA

Fig. 1

System model.

U
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is to perform a keyword search to obtain version
information V . The second stage is to match the attribute
with the access policy. The attribute must not intersect
with the attribute set in the denied access policy, and it
also contains the set of attributes in the allowed access
policy. When both stages meet the requirements, the
server sends a ciphertext CT to the user.
(7) Dec.CT; p; Bi / ! m: The user calculates the
algorithm, inputs ciphertext CT, matches information p,
and decrypts parameter Bi . The plaintext m is obtained
by calculation.

4

System Specification

Setup.1 / ! .Par; T /: Given the security parameter
, the trusted AA running the algorithm outputs the
bilinear mapping par; random numbers .a; b/ 2 Zq are
generated, and a hash function H W .0; 1/ ! G1 is
defined. Finally, the public parameter par is outputted,
par D .a; b; g; g a ; g b ; G1 ; G2 ; e;
O q; H /:
The AA generates an attribute table, which is private
to the AA, and various attributes are placed in the
table, as shown in Table 1. Its coordinates represent
this attribute in the calculation. The coordinates are
composed of random numbers, and the coordinate data
are periodically replaced. When the coordinate data in
Table 1 are replaced, the AA calculates the new version
information V .
EncT.t1 ; t2 ; ss/ ! .U1 ; U2 ; B/: The AA receives the
allowed access policy t1 and the denial of access policy
t2 uploaded by the DO, and then the AA searches in
Table 1 to obtain the coordinate data ss,
ss D Œ.x1 ; y1 /; .x2 ; y2 /; : : : ; .xi ; yi /;
.x1 ; y1 /; .x2 ; y2 /; : : : ; .xu ; yu /; 1 6 i; u 6 n:
The AA calculates U1 , U2 , and encryption parameter
B using the coordinate data in ss,
U1 D Œ.g x1 ; g y1 /; .g x2 ; g y2 /; : : : ; .g xi ; g yi /;
Table 1
y
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
::
:
yn

x1
A11
A12
A13
A14
A15
::
:
A1n

x2
A21
A22
A23
A24
A25
::
:
A2n

Property list instance.
x
x3
x4
x5

A31 A41 A51   
A32 A42 A52   
A33 A43 A53   
A34 A44 A54   
A35 A45 A55   
::
::
::
::
:
:
:
:
A3n A4n A5n   

xn
An1
An2
An3
An4
An5
::
:
Ann
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U2 D Œ.g x1 ; g y1 /; .g x2 ; g y2 /; : : : ; .g xu ; g yu /;
BD

n
Y

y

H.xi i /:

1

Enc.m; k; w; B; par/ ! .C T; '/: The ciphertext CT
contains ciphertext Ck and Cm , C T D .Ck ; Cm /, and
the DO uses symmetric encryption to encrypt plaintext
m to obtain ciphertext Cm . The encryption key is k, key
k is encrypted, a random number t
Zp is generated,
and then calculate
Ck D Œe.g
O a ; g b /t  k; g t ; B t :
The DO needs to establish an index in the data. Where
the set of keywords is w. Then, the random number set
S
Zp is generated, and then calculate
' D Œ.g s1 ; w1s1 /; .g s2 ; w2s2 /; : : : ; .g sn ; wnsn /:
Trap.w; par/ ! Tw : The algorithm inputs the
keyword set w that needs to be inquired, generates the
random number set L
Zp , and calculates:
Tw D Œ.g l1 ; wil11 /; .g l2 ; wil22 /; : : : ; .g ln ; wilnn /:
KeyGen.att; V / ! SKa : After data interaction
between the user and server, the user receives the
version information V sent by the CS, and the user sends
the att together with the version information V to the
AA. The AA searches the corresponding attribute data
in Table 1 of the corresponding version V of the user
attribute att, and then calculates the attribute data SKa
from the coordinate data,
SKa D Œ.g ˛1 ; g ˇ1 /; .g ˛2 ; g ˇ2 /; : : : ; .g ˛n ; g ˇn /:
Search.U1 ; U2 ; Tw ; SKa / ! 1 or 0, the retrieval is
divided into two phases.
Phase 1: The user uploads trapdoor Tw to the CS,
and the server matches the trapdoor with the index. The
calculation process is as follows:
e.g
O l1 ; w1s1 / D e.g
O s1 ; wil11 /:
If the equation is true, the proof is the same keyword.
If the equation is false, the next keyword is evaluated
until the last keyword in the index. The server sends the
version information V of the data to the user.
Phase 2: The user uploads the attribute private key
SKa to the server, and the CS matches the attribute with
the access policy. Given that two access policies exist
in this solution, the attributes contained in the denial of
access policy must not be included by the user attribute
private key. The user attribute private key SKa needs to
be matched with the denial of access policy U2 first, and
the following is calculated:

Tsinghua Science and Technology, October 2020, 25(5): 579–588

584

U2 \ SKa D Œ.g x1 ; g y1 /; .g x2 ; g y2 /; : : : ; .g xu ; g yu /\
.g ˛1 ; g ˇ1 /; .g ˛2 ; g ˇ2 /; : : : ; .g ˛n ; g ˇn /:
If the matching result is not an empty set, then 0 is
output. If the matching result is an empty set, then the
user attribute private key SKa matches the allowed access
policy U1 . The calculation is as follows:
U1 \ SKa D Œ.g x1 ; g y1 /; .g x2 ; g y2 /; : : : ; .g xi ; g yi /\
.g ˛1 ; g ˇ1 /; .g ˛2 ; g ˇ2 /; : : : ; .g ˛n ; g ˇn /:
When the result is U1 , the server outputs 1 and sends
the ciphertext CT. The server packages the successfully
matched attributes to generate matching information p.
Dec.CT; p; Bi / ! m: The user uses the algorithm
to decrypt the ciphertext CT sent by the server. First,
the user obtains the matching attribute information from
the matching information p, calculates the decryption
parameter, and generates a random number r
Zp .
The calculation is as follow:
e.g
O r ; Bt /
e.g
O a ; g b /t  k 
D
e.g
O ba Bir ; g t /
e.g
O r ; Bt /
e.g
O a ; g b /t  k 
D
e.g
O ba ; g t /e.B
O ir ; g t /
e.g
O r ; Bt /
e.g
O a ; g b /t  k 
D
ba
e.g
O
; g t /e.B
O i ; g/rt
e.g;
O B/rt
e.g;
O g/abt  k 
D k:
e.g;
O g/abt e.B
O i ; g/rt
Then, plaintext m is solved by using the symmetric
decryption algorithm.

5

Security Analysis

The scheme can ensure data security. The data are
encrypted by a symmetric algorithm, and the key k
uses public key encryption to obtain ciphertext Ck .
The keyword trapdoor is randomly encrypted; thus the
scheme is statistically IND-KGA secure. In addition,
the ciphertext Ck is constructed according to the DBDH
assumption, and the proposed scheme is statistically
IND-CCA secure under the DBDH assumption.
Theorem 1 Indicates that the proposed scheme is
statistically IND-KGA secure.
Proof The keyword trapdoor is unrecognizable.
Setup: Challenger C generates a random number
.a; b/ ! Zp , and the public parameters par D .a; b;
g; g a ; g b ; G1 ; G2 ; e;
O q; H /.
Phase 1: Adversary A selects the keyword set
.w1 ; w2 ; : : : ; wn / and sends it to Challenger C. The
Challenger outputs the trapdoor set .Tw1 ; Tw2 ; : : : ; Twn /

generated by the keyword set and sends it to Adversary A.
Challenge: Adversary A selects keywords w0 and
w1 that are not in the keyword set in Phase 1 from
the keyword space. Challenger C flips a random coin
 2 .0; 1/ , runs the algorithm Trap.w; par/, and finally,
sends the trapdoor Tw to Adversary A.
Phase 2: Adversary A sends the keyword set to
Challenger C again, the same as in Phase 1.
Guess: Adversary A outputs 0 . If 0 D , Adversary
A wins the game. The scheme is statistically INDKGA secure. The keyword trapdoor introduces random
numbers during encryption; thus the trapdoors generated
by the same keyword are different, which can effectively
resist a statistical keyword guessing attack.

Theorem 2 The proposed scheme is statistically
IND-CCA secure under the DBDH assumption.
Adversary A and Challenger C perform the game as
follows.
Proof Adversary A cannot recognize the ciphertext
under the DBDH assumption.
Setup: The system is established, the security
parameter  is generated, and then the algorithm
Setup.1 / is run to obtain the security parameters par D
.a; b; g; g a ; g b ; G1 ; G2 ; e;
O q; H / and the encryption
parameter B in the system. Given groups G1 , G2 ,
and map eO W G1  G1 ! G2 , Challenger C randomly
generates .a; b; c; z/
Zp to generate a quintuple T0 .
T0 D .g; A D g a ; B D g b ; C D g c ; Z D e.g;
O g/z /.
Phase 1: Adversary A runs encryption algorithm
multiple times.
Challenge: Adversary A randomly selects two
keywords m0 and m1 from the plaintext space and sends
them to Challenger C. Challenger C flips a random coin
 2 .0; 1/, runs the algorithm Enc.m; k; w; B; par/ !
.CT; '/, and finally, sends the ciphertext CT to
Adversary A.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: Adversary A outputs a plaintext 0 , if  D 0 ,
Adversary A wins the security game.

According to the above proof, we conclude that our
proposed scheme is statistically IND-CCA secure under
the DBDH assumption. The ciphertext structure in the
scheme is similar to the five-tuple structure in the DBDH
assumption and has unrecognizable properties.

6
6.1

Performance Analysis
Theoretical analysis

In theory, three main aspects of the U-ABE scheme
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are compared with those of several other schemes:
functionality, storage cost, and communication cost.
The symbols in the comparison process are defined as
follows: jpj indicates the length of the data element in
Zp ; jgj indicates the length of the data element in G;
jgT j indicates the length of the data element in GT ; nu
indicates the number of attributes associated with the
user; nc indicates the number of attributes associated
with the ciphertext; nk indicates the number of attributes
in the user key; and na indicates the number of attributes
of the entire system.
6.1.1

Functional analysis

Table 2 compares the functional differences between
the U-ABE scheme and the other three schemes. The
revocation mechanism of each scheme is immediately
revoked. The difference between U-ABE and the other
three schemes lies in the revocation direction. The UABE scheme has a denial of access policy and can
thus be revoked in both directions. The U-ABE scheme
adopts the AND mode for access strategy, whereas the
other schemes adopt the Tree or the LSSS mode, which
consumes less resources and is more efficient.
6.1.2

Storage cost

In Table 3, the U-ABE scheme is compared with schemes
in Refs. [13, 18, 20] for storage cost. It is mainly divided
into four components for comparison: AA, DO, CS, and
U. In the U-ABE scheme, the main role of the AA is to
generate attribute tables, encrypt two-way access policy,
and assign private keys. The AA mainly stores random
Table 2
Program
Scheme in Ref. [18]
ABKS-UR[13]
AD-KP-ABE[20]
U-ABE

Program
Scheme in Ref. [18]
ABKS-UR[13]
AD-KP-ABE[20]
U-ABE

Program
Scheme in Ref. [18]
ABKS-UR[13]
AD-KP-ABE[20]
U-ABE

Access structure
LSSS
Tree
Tree
AND

AA
.4 C na /jpj
–
2na jpj
.2na C 1/jpj

AA&U
4jgj C nk jgj
–
nk jpj
2nk C nk jpj
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numbers and tables. Thus the storage cost of the AA in
the U-ABE scheme is calculated as .2na C 1/jpj. In
terms of DO, the main job of the DO in the scheme is to
receive the policy ciphertext, generate the index, encrypt
the data, and then upload it to the CS. The storage cost
of the DO is calculated as 2jpj C jgj, which is smaller
than the storage cost of schemes in Refs. [13, 18, 20].
On the CS side, the main task of the CS in the U-ABE
scheme is to receive the ciphertext data uploaded by the
DO and the search information and attribute private key
uploaded by the U, and then matching calculation is
performed between the two. Therefore, the storage cost
is calculated as .nc C nk /jgj C 2jgT j. Unlike schemes
in Refs. [13, 20], the U-ABE scheme reduces the storage
cost of the CS. Finally, in the U aspect, the U’s job in the
scheme is to receive the attribute private key SKa from
the AA, calculate the attribute private key SKa , generate
the trapdoor, and decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, the
U storage cost is calculated as 2nk C jpj, which is lower
than the schemes in Refs. [13, 18].
6.1.3

Communication cost

Table 4 shows a theoretical analysis of communication
cost, which is mainly divided into the data transmission
cost of four lines. The first is AA & U. In U-ABE,
the AA and U mainly transmit attributes and attribute
parameters; therefore, the calculated communication
cost is 2nk C nk jpj. Followed by AA and O, in
the U-ABE scheme, the plaintext, ciphertext, and
encryption parameters of the two-way access policy are
mainly transmitted between the AA and the DO, so the

Function comparison.
Revocation method
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate
Immediate

Safe question
q-parallel BDHE
DBDH
DBDH
DBDH

Table 3 Cost comparison.
DO
CS
.2 C na /jgj C jgT j
jgT j C .3nc C 1/jgj
.3 C na /jgj C jgT j
jgT .nc C 2/ C jgj.na C 1/
nc jgj C jpj
.nc C nk /jgj C jgT j.nc C 2/
2jpj C jgj
.nc C nk /jgj C 2jgT j

Table 4 Communication cost comparison.
AA&DO
CS&U
2jgj C jgT j C na jgj
jgT j C .3nc C 1/jgj
–
2jpj C .nc C 3/jgT j C .nc C 4/=2
nc jgj C nk jgT j
jpj C .nc C 2/jgj C nc jgT j
4nc C jpj
jpj C .nk C 2/jgT j C nc jgj

Revoke direction
Forward
Forward
Forward
Two-way

U
.2 C nk /jgj
2nu jgj C lg.nu C 2/
nk jpj
2nk C jpj

CS&DO
.3nc C 1/jgj
.2nk C 1/jgj C .nc C 1/jgj
jpjnk C jgj
.jgT j C 1/nc C .nc C 1/jpj
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communication cost can be calculated as 4nc C jpj. The
comparison of the scheme in this paper with schemes in
Refs. [18,20] shows that communication costs are greatly
reduced. In the CS and U process, the server in the UABE scheme has two data interactions with the data
user, mainly the transmission of the trapdoor ciphertext
and attribute private key, thus the communication cost
is jpj C .nk C 1/jgT j C nc jgj, which is superior to the
other three schemes. Finally, in the CS and DO process,
the DO in the U-ABE scheme unilaterally uploads the
ciphertext data to the CS. Thus the communication cost
is calculated as .jgT j C 1/nc C .nc C 1/jpj.
6.2

Experiment analysis

The experimental platform is a 64 bits Windows
operating system, on an Intel Core(TM) i5-4570
3.20 GHz CPU with 8.00 GB memory. The experimental
code is modified and written based on Pairing-Based
Cryptography library (PBC), using a super singular curve
in Class A, that is E.Fq / W y 2 D x 3 C x. Group Gs is
subgroup of E.Fq /, the order of the group Gs is 160 bits,
and the base field is 58 bits. This experiment is conducted
with four considerations: encryption time, private key
generation overhead, retrieval time, and decryption time.
The relationship among the number of attributes, the
number of keywords, and the time cost is tested.
6.2.1

Encryption time

Figure 2 shows a comparison of the encryption time of
the U-ABE scheme with schemes in Ref. [18], ABKSUR[13] , and AD-KP-ABE[20] . The analysis shows that
the U-ABE is superior to the scheme in Ref. [18] and
ABKS-UR[13] .
6.2.2

Private key generation time

Figure 3 shows a comparison of the private key

Fig. 2

Encryption time experiment comparison.

Fig. 3

Private key cost experiment comparison.

generation overhead of the U-ABE, the scheme in Ref.
[18], and ABKS-UR[13] . Figure 3 indicates that as
the number of attributes submitted by users increases,
the private key generation time increases linearly. The
private key of U-ABE is generated by hashing and
exponential operation, which gives this scheme higher
computational efficiency than the other two schemes.
6.2.3

Search time

Figure 4 shows the results of a comparison experiment
of the retrieval cost for U-ABE, scheme in Ref. [18], and
ABKS-UR[13] . The comparison experiment in Fig. 4
is the effect of the number of attributes in the user’s
private key on the retrieval time. Also, the keyword is
set to 10, because the attribute matching of U-ABE is
matched in the form of a set, the time overhead is much
smaller than that of the other two schemes. Although
U-ABE joins the random number calculation that forms
an unrecognizable trapdoor, because only one bilinear
calculation and one exponential operation are used in the
trapdoor construction process, the calculation amount is

Fig. 4

Search time experiment comparison.
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less than that of the other two schemes.
6.2.4

Decryption time

Figure 5 shows a comparison of the decryption time of
U-ABE with scheme in Ref. [18] and AD-KP-ABE[20] .
As seen from Fig. 5, the decryption time increases as the
number of attributes in the user’s private key increases.
The analysis shows that U-ABE has obvious advantages
over the scheme in Ref. [18] in terms of decryption
time. When the number of attributes in the user’s private
key reaches 50, the decryption time of U-ABE is less
than 1 s.
The decryption time in U-ABE increases as the
number of attributes in the private key increases mainly
because of the calculation of the decryption parameters,
but the decryption algorithm is only a multiplication
operation and the decryption time expansion rate is low.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we propose a ciphertext retrieval scheme
called U-ABE based on unrecognizable trapdoors. First,
we introduce a denial of access policy that can implement
two-way revocation to implement the flexible control of
access attributes. Moreover, because the access policy
is not embedded in the ciphertext, flexible attribute
revocation can be completed by modifying the access
policy. Second, we introduce the mechanism of the
attribute table. Through the reliable AA, an attribute
table with random coordinates is created. The attributes
of the users and owners are based on Table 1, which
reduces the matching calculation time. We finally use
the bilinearity of the bilinear pair to construct a one-time
trapdoor that realizes the same keyword with different
encryption results each time, ensuring keyword privacy.
Through theoretical safety analysis and experimental

Fig. 5

Decryption time comparison experiment.
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verification, we prove that our scheme has high security
and retrieval efficiency in real data sets. Future work
will be performed to improve the solution in terms of
AA credibility, accuracy, and efficiency, and to conduct a
profound study of trapdoor security issues with the goal
of achieving higher security.
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